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Democracy Final Exam

Lukas Otteson

Professor Burkhart

POLS 597

Spring 2024

Coppedge et al. claimed that Polity & Freedom house aren’t truly “indices of democracy at all, even though they are regarded as such” (2011, p. 27). Coppedge et al. noted a problem in this field of research being a “severe tradeoff” between thick generalized-concepts & thinly-defined models (2011, p. 1). V-Dem’s concepts branch into several smaller components (Coppedge et al., 2011). They are not without their critics, though. Coppedge et al. reported, “Some question whether it should be done at all, as the most disaggregated indicators contain the most fine–grained information, so each successive level of aggregation sacrifices more potentially useful information,” (2011, p. 15). Whether V-Dem produces some uber-approach to measuring democracy or not, their methods are distinctly different from those of Freedom House & Polity. This essay will present a brief synopsis for each organization style of measuring democracy and conclude with an analysis about Coppedge et al.’s claim and a discussion about how V-Dem improves upon the measures taken by Freedom House & Polity.

Freedom House represented democracy more than it defined it, penning “Democracy engenders constructive international cooperation and peaceful competition rather than violent confrontations,” and “Democracies adhere to the rule of law and form alliances based on shared norms of international behavior,” (2021). They wrote that whatever “failings” of American democracy there may be (or have been), we, nor democracy itself, is defined by such failures (2021). Rather, “It is our response to these shortcomings, our resilience in the face of adversity, that has thus far guided our path,” (2021). Democracy is not some utopia. Instead, Freedom House wrote: “It is the honest admission that democracy is messy, and often fails to produce rapid responses to pressing problems. But democracy possesses self-correcting properties that brittle authoritarian regimes do not. The answer to democracy’s shortcomings is more responsive democracy,” (2021). Democratic systems may catch low-hanging flak from opportunist mud-slingers, but tyrannical alternatives are hardly appealing to those accustomed to having a voice & a vote. “Citizens of democracies can effect change by regularly holding their governments accountable for their failings” (Freedom House, 2021). Furthermore, Freedom House continued, “Dissatisfaction, even alienation, occurs within democracies when ‘throwing the rascals out’ through elections doesn’t produce the change the public seeks. But accountability is still democracy’s greatest strength. For authoritarian regimes, accountability is democracy’s greatest threat,” (Freedom House, 2021). What respectable public-figure would stake their reputation on advocating against accountability? Freedom House operationalizes their views with seven interrelated strategies: (1) “elevating democracy as a core policy priority through a Presidential Directive and a National Democracy Strategy”; (2) “revitalizing our diplomacy to support democracy; (3) “strengthening the pillars of democracy, including free and fair elections, independent media, and civil society”; (4) integrating the development and regulation of technology with shared democratic and human rights values; (5) countering and curbing the poisonous flood of disinformation; (6) combating corruption and kleptocracy; and (7) “using economic statecraft to support open societies and inclusive economies,” (2021).

Dr. Monty G. Marshall (Director of the Polity Project & the Center for Systemic Peace) directly addressed the challenging task of defining/describing democracy, saying that “Democracy is not an abstract notion; it is a management technique that provides educated humans the ability to manage complexity,” (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). Marshall added, “Modern societal-systems are complex cooperation schemes governed by the rule of law, that is, the codification of those essential cooperation schemes so that individual citizens can act (by compliance) to augment and, so, ensure the common good,” (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). There is certainly some overlap here with the writings mentioned earlier from Freedom House (the citizens of a democracy ought be empowered). Marshall also stated, “Democracy is not a voting system, although voting has become prominent as a decision-making method. All forms of governance employ voting procedures to some extent,” and that it “happens naturally in well-developed systems when most citizens accept a vow of non-violence and recognize the legitimacy of enforcement through judicial law” (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). For Marshall, the empowerment of the democratically governed is not without its inherent responsibilities. Beyond merely following rules, these systems also required “super-cooperator” managers that “prioritize the common good and work to build and maintain system cooperation,” (Marshall, 2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). That isn’t all, though. The power of the vote is not glossed over. Marshall commented that “Leadership selection is not a personal popularity contest but, rather, a whole-of-society testament of faith and trust in leadership candidacy and responsibility to the future of the nation, (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). Marshall didn’t miss the chance to call the ‘leaders’ to the mat either, stating that “Political parties are groups charged with identifying and presenting for leadership approval (national elections) only those persons who demonstrate the ability and capacity to maintain (and repair or adapt) the system into the future,” (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). Again, nobody is calling democratic system utopic. Marshall concluded: “We must recognize and accept that complex systems are not only superior in performance but, also, prone to pathologies, the worst among which are political anomie, violence, and chaos. These can only be resolved through enhanced cooperation and our mutual embrace of our common predicament,” (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). Far from cynicism in the face adversity, Marshall prescribed resilience & a proactive attitude.

This publication (and the V-Dem project writ-large) brought to life much of the quantitative data-collecting that has been taking place within the last two centuries of political change. Over a hundred countries contributed to the gathering of around 10 million records! Fortunately, social scientists are allowed to use theories to help narrow down their focus and filter attention toward productive/progressive inquiry. Simply having all of this data is like the possible stream of stimuli that is available to everyone on Earth at any given moment. However, our subconscious visual systems filter out infrared, UV, microwave, etc. We only have one attention span & one working memory, so we basically have to “pick our battles” (cognitively/mindfully). The V-Dem project attempts to do that.

            Getting as far as this project has gotten has taken time and effort. All of that data might seem like a problem from a particular perspective. The numbers of country experts and the amount of data grew over time. Getting all of that did not occur overnight. So, it should be treated as an achievement of sorts (incremental/iterative progression). In order to elevate that progress, political scientists can use theories to help filter our efforts with the glut of information.

            Additionally, many operation definitions needed to be set. Coppedge et al. explored seven principles throughout the book (2020). Those being: 1) electoral, 2) liberal, 3) majoritarian, 4) consensual, 5) participatory, 6) deliberative, and 7) egalitarian (Coppedge et al., 2020). Each of these principles embody core values, question, and attributes.

With the electoral principle (1): the core values are contestation/competition; the main attributes are inclusive suffrage, clean elections, elected officials, freedom of association, freedom of expression, & alternative information; and the theme question is “Are important government offices filled by free and fair multiparty elections before a broad electorate?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the liberal principle (2): the core values are individual liberty, checks and balances, & constitutionalism; the main attributes are civil liberties, judicial independence, & legislative independence; and the theme question is “Is power constrained and are individual rights guaranteed?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the majoritarian principle (3): the core values are majority rule, power concentration, efficient decision-making, & responsible party government; the main attributes are power-concentrating institutions, power-centralizing institutions, & simple majority decision-making; and the theme question is “Does the majority rule via one party, and does it dominate policy making?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the consensual principal (4): the core values are voice/representation of all groups, power dispersion, & power sharing; the main attributes are power-dispensing institutions, power decentralizing institutions, & supermajority decision-making; and the theme question is “Do numerous, independent, and diverse groups and institutions participate in policy making?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the participatory principal (5): the core values are direct/active participation in decision-making by the people; the main attributes are high turnout, mechanisms of direct democracy, civil society activism, & local democracy; and the theme question is “Do citizens participate in political decision-making?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the deliberative principal (6): the core values are reasoned debate, rational arguments and consultation; the main attributes are public debate, respectful/open-minded discussions, reason to justification with reference to the public good, and consultative institutions; and the theme question is “Are political decisions the product of public deliberation based on reasoned and rational justification?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the egalitarian principal (7):

the core values are equal political capabilities; the main attributes are equal protection of rights/freedoms, equal distribution of politically relevant resources equal access to power;

and the theme question is “Are all citizens equally capable to use their political rights?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29).

The V-Dem Institute added that “Each Principle is represented by a separate index, and each is regarded as a separate outcome in the proposed study. In this manner we reconceptualize democracy from a single outcome to a set of outcomes,” and that they “break down each core principle into its constituent components, each to be measured separately,” (n.d., Varieties of Democracy section). As mentioned earlier, “Components include features such as free and fair elections, civil liberties, judicial independence, executive constraints, gender equality, media freedom, and civil society,” (V-Dem Institute, Varieties of Democracy section). Then, “each component is disaggregated into specific indicators,” (V-Dem Institute, Varieties of Democracy section).

Freedom House & Polity measure distinct concepts. Coppedge et al. would likely contend that some overlap is overlooked in the way that they operationalize & conceptualize democracy. Freedom House & Polity don’t disaggregate like V-Dem. The Varieties of Democracy Institute represents more within its tertiary concepts. They avoid reliance on a small subset of terminology. V-Dem is also uncovering more revealing data that point aspiring democratic polities toward proactive, constructive steps-forward. They’ve found a way to incorporate more of the massive database without trading off for a cumbersome jargon. Additionally, they’ve been able to contribute to an open-sourcing of this research effort by subverting the concern about Polity & Freedom House being “biased toward a US-centric understanding of democracy because they have been mostly or completely funded by US government agencies,” (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 4). By that same token, they’ve also lightened the burden of relying upon English interpretation by casting a wider linguistic net. Future researchers around the world may find themselves more inclined to use V-Dem’s methodology for these reasons.

Scholars may continue to rely on Polity & Freedom House for a couple few reasons. If they are doing their research in comparison with the United States, then maybe they would consider the bias to be appropriate. Some scholars may be receiving funding from similar sources. Another reason might be that V-Dem’s methods are difficult/expensive to mimic (i.e., coordinating with, cultivating, and finding country experts).

The point that Coppedge et al. & V-Dem are making about democratic-indices is not an indictment regarding Freedom House’s or Polity’s good-faith, but more so an assertion about their approach. They’re not saying that those organizations are studying something other than democracy. What they are saying is that they don’t index with their methods.

References

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S. E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., ... & Wilson, S. (2011). Varieties of democracy: Measurement model testing and comparison. Kellogg Institute.

Freedom House. (2021). Reversing the Tide: Introduction. Democracy Task Force. Retrieved August 2, 2024, from https://freedomhouse.org/democracy-task-force/special-report/2021/reversing-the-tide/introduction

Marshall, M.G. (2024). Systemic Peace. Retrieved August 2, 2024, from https://www.systemicpeace.org/index.html

V-Dem Institute. (n.d.). The V-Dem Project. Retrieved August 2, 2024, from https://www.v-dem.net/about/v-dem-project/

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How does political culture impact democratic performance? To answer that question, this essay will investigate from two different perspectives: historically & liberationally. How does a democracy’s past help us understand its ability to sustain such delicate institutions? What kind of political culture is brought forth by emancipative values? After answering these questions, we’ll turn our attention toward explaining the importance of political culture as an important variable for evaluating democratic performance.

In order to theoretically-ground this discussion, let’s consider Barrington Moore Jr.’s “Social Origins of Dictatorship & Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World” (1966) & Robert Dahl’s “Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition” (1971).

Moore’s five “main conditions that have apparently been most important for the development of democracy” are the first set of focal points for our purposes with this paper (1966). Those preconditions are as follows: (1) development of a balance to avoid too strong a crown or two independent a landed aristocracy, (2) a turn toward an appropriate form of commercial agriculture, (3) the weakening of a landed aristocracy, (4) the prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the peasants and workers, and (5) a revolutionary break with the past (Moore, 1966, p. 430-432).

Moore used his framework to explore & analyze the paths-to-democracy for feudal England, revolutionary France, the United States, Imperial China, feudal Japan, and post-colonial India (1966). Each of those countries have their own histories. Their status-quos are the results of their pasts. Each government’s ability to sanction their people is tied to their development. Whether people can oppose their government (or participate with it) is largely dependent upon the table their ancestors have set for them. If all of Moore’s preconditions are met (or unmet), then there are some heuristics available that might be able to help figure out why. We’ll return to Moore’s perspective after hearing from Dahl.

Dahl used some keywords in the hopes of helping future political-scientists organize their general thoughts about democracy. When it came to the problem/dilemma of power-concentration, this was broken down into two opposing forces: tolerance & suppression. (Dahl, 1971). This is actually good place to segue into another issue raised by Dahl: socioeconomic levels of development (1971). Each state will face their own unique sets of real-world challenges & constraints (although with some similarities). It would be more difficult to suppress a populace that has parity of force. In Dahl’s terms, the costs of suppression might be too high if the government is less developed (1971). By that same token, a developed state may contain a citizenry helpless to no option other than tolerance.

 To answer the question that arose from the brief Moore section, consider Dahl’s Figures 1.1 & 1.2 (p. 6-7): states range from closed hegemonies (unpopularized & illiberalized), oligarchies (non-inclusive with public contestation), open hegemonies (inclusive without public contestation), & polyarchies (liberalized & popularized) (1971). The journey is important because these contextual/situational similarities/differences result in idiosyncratic power-disparities. States can expect certain challenges depending on their levels of development & status-quos. There isn’t a cookie-cutter solution/journey. Each states’ path should be as specific as its challenges & constraints.

Dahl’s framework helps add some depth to a general synopsis of Moore’s work. According to Dahl, states range from closed hegemonies (unpopularized & illiberalized), oligarchies (non-inclusive with public contestation), open hegemonies (inclusive without public contestation), & polyarchies (liberalized & popularized) (1971). Those classifications would adhere to pretty extreme cases, so the term “near-polyarchy” is also operationalized (Dahl, 1971). Dahl was also concerned with a government/state’s ability to sanction its people with impunity. This was phrased as “costs of toleration” & “costs of suppression” and a reference to concentration of power (Dahl, 1971, p. 15-16). Each state/government’s socioeconomic level of development informs the state of said concentration with its institutions, norms, capabilities, etc. (Dahl, 1971). With that in mind, let’s revisit the questions of this essay.

Competitive oligarchies face different challenges than open-hegemonies on the way toward polyarchy/democracy. The oligarchs limit their citizens from actually being included in decision-making (despite their ability to at least ritualistically engage in public-contestation). In the inclusive-hegemonies, the people can participate so long they don’t publicly disagree with their overlords. Both of these may be distasteful, but Dahl argued that they were not equally likely to take steps in the polyarchic direction (1971). A competitive regime offers a better chance because popular representation helps to assure quality of inclusiveness, but concentration of power/wealth increases the likelihood of pearl-clutching in favor of liberalization.

Dahl also provided five axioms to help compartmentalize/contextualize his framework:

“Axiom #1: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the expected costs of toleration increase.”

“Axiom #2: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the expected costs of suppression increase.”

“Axiom #3: The more the cost of suppression exceed the costs of toleration, the greater the chance for a competitive regime.” (Dahl, 1971, p.15).

Dahl’s fourth axiom was: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the resources available to the government for suppression decline relative to the resources of an opposition” (1971, p. 48). Lastly, Axiom #5 was “The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases with a reduction in the capacity of the government to use violence or socioeconomic sanctions to suppress an opposition,” (p. 49).

History & emancipative values shape political culture. The values of the past help explain the status-quo of the present. That can manifest itself through whether or not Moore’s preconditions are met. Those preconditions also speak to the costs-of-toleration/suppression. If a government is much stronger than its people, then it can afford to abuse them without being held accountable. If a culture historically suppresses stories of uprisings/resistances against authoritarian/dictatorial regimes, then how much more friction is going to lie in the way of prosocial actors within that system/society? How much more bottom-up rejection does one face when attempting to counter the artificially popularized narrative? The perceived permissiveness attributed to suppression would be a result of history & values. People can be coerced into keeping gates that are invisible to them and for people that view them as petty & insignificant). People can become accustomed to a sense of helplessness with regard to the social fabric they’ve come to call ‘reality.’ Depending on the values of the culture, a given citizen may have to accept great risk in order to accurately comment on the emperor’s lack of clothing. When there is a historical precedent that is culturally prevalent enough, the tyrants can be exposed by being listened to. A wise culture is primed to recognize cheap tricks, appeals to our pathological selves & biases, deflecting tactics, defense mechanism, etc. History teaches us that much, but the openness of a culture’s approach to history-education may partially depend on the recognition of the costs related to running from the past.

Political culture helps to inform a citizenry about what they should not tolerate. A political culture that is imposed is unlikely to allow such information to spread very far. Culture can help people identify what suppression looks like and it might even be able to help them hear where they’ve repressed. A culture where thinking isn’t allowed is disrespectful to what culture is capable of enabling a people. Political culture is an incredibly important variable for explaining democratic performance, because it is a result of their freedoms. A vibrant, creative, and innovative society does not evolve from shuddered eggshell tip-toeing. People have to pay their bills and put food on the table for their families. If they have to accept risking those things in order to participate in the culture, then the culture is going to barren & destitute (left in the hands of supposed pundits & authority-given politicians). The political culture is a reflection of the population’s aggregated assessment with regard to their own costs-of-toleration/suppression. The power-distances are in the air. 

References

Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. Yale University Press.

Moore, B. (1966). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. Beacon Press.