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POLS 505 Comparative Politics Final Exam

Lukas Otteson

Fall 2024, Dr. Burkhart

Political Culture

After a brief foreword, this paper will discuss some of the ways that researchers have studied PC, the significance of their findings, and some strengths/weaknesses. After becoming grounded with some of the current literature, two conceptualizations of PC and two measurement strategies will be proposed (with an eye on how valid & reliable these propositions are). The conclusion will address any unanswered questions that might help orient future research.

‘Political culture’ (PC) can be a slippery term to wrangle. Part of why it is so easy to conflate or misnomer is because it is a traveling concept. Stretching the concept might make attractive prospects out of parsimonious reductivity or over-simplified generalizations. Heuristics might not be sufficient for coming to grips with the complexity, though. The question of how PC is operationalized may have a more case-specific answer, but how it is theorized/defined might guide researchers in more degenerative or progressive directions. ‘Politics’ and ‘culture’ each carry with them a lot of baggage (in the minds of both scholars and laymen). It can be difficult to clearly delineate where politics and culture begin & end, but that is a topic for a different time. PC is narrower in scope and comparative politics methods are instructive for how this material is covered academically (though both ‘between’ and ‘within’ studies would certainly be of interest). With those considerations in mind, though, there are valid concerns to be voiced in regard to whether or not the current conceptualization of PC is sufficiently broad. If all of the priming variables are factored in, doesn’t PC look like it is influenced by phenomena covered by other fields (e.g., cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, journalism, literacy, philosophy, mass media)? A more general social science perspective might be able to help inform the generation of PC hypotheses by making more explicit some of the implications that are more/less likely to drive their findings. Studying what combination of causes lead to the development of an idiosyncratic culture would be instrumental toward the ultimate goal of understanding that nuanced culture. There does seem to be more room to do that with PC research.

For the sake of establishing an operational definition, Nolan & Lenski (as cited in Welzel & Inglehart, 2020, p. 311) wrote that culture “includes traditions, habits, and patterns of behaviour shaped by a society’s prevailing beliefs, norms, and values.” Welzel & Inglehart wrote that a ‘political culture’ is where the traditions, habits, and behavioral patterns are shaped by political beliefs, norms, and values (2020). These might come to represent a ‘national character’ (Welzel & Inglehart, 2020). People shape their identities with cultural belonging (Welzel & Inglehart, 2020). When it comes to behavioral manifestations of PC, patterns of political behavior can become habitualized within population segments or collective units (Welzel & Inglehart, 2020). Traits can be penalized in one culture and rewarded in another. Political traits might include positions on debates or moral disgust/outrage to a given stimuli. There would seem to be some overlap with religiosity, too. Some PCs (& subcultures) draw from religious texts & figures more so than others. Cross-culturally variety exists. Inglehart (as cited in Welzel & Inglehart, 2020, p. 313) found that ‘sacred versus secular values’ & ‘patriarchal versus emancipative values’ were the two major dimension of cultural difference and that “between” societal differences were usually much larger than “within” societal differences. Democratic societies have different PCs than autocratic societies. Understanding a PC’s values would likely require some historical insight into how their values have changed (whether that be acute events or chronic build-up. Social constraints also constrain PCs (i.e., the institutions that must articulate, implement, and enforce policies are a product of that state’s capabilities & past performance). The promise/potential of communication between representatives & the public is a product of the PC. If a nation cannot coordinate, then they’re going to have a hard time creating a cultivated orientation rather than an anarchic happenstance). This will make it more difficult to plan goal-seeking strategies and to effectively manage organizational priorities. Policy implementation and collective action require willpower. PC might remind of the old adage: “a house divided against itself”…

Inglehart made some really interesting observations about “intergenerational change” of cultural values (1971). Whether people grew up wealthy or poor informs their values. Age cohorts can reveal changed preferences & priorities (via adult attitude change or the mechanism of intergenerational change (Inglehart, 1971). Inglehart operationalized what he called “acquisitive” (i.e., motivation toward subsistence levels/behavior) & “post-bourgeois” (i.e., affluence and hedonic aspiration treadmills, belonging, aesthetic, intellectual needs) value-pairs (1971).

Welzel & Inglehart studied the relationship between life satisfaction, agency, and emancipative values (2010). Knowing that things differ more between than within, it doesn’t exactly seem rational for state to build a PC where their citizens are not given opportunities to exercise agency.

Blais et al. showed that people support democracy more when their votes win (2017). What this might suggest is that less competitive elections lead to higher satisfaction with democracy in the short-run after elections. If there is a large majority in a given nation, then it is fair to assume that certain social phenomena (diffusion of responsibility, group think, out-group hostility, in-group loyalty, etc.) are more likely than they would be amongst a plurality. The social costs of contradicting prevailing beliefs might tend to be higher. The costs of social sanctioning might be lower. Argumentum ad populum will be all too tempting for those beneficiaries of the status-quo. Is blame-shifting less likely when a culture is insulating from divergent perspectives or is there always someone/something else to be scapegoated? The propensity for majorities to become mobs may remain worrisome when they’re primed for outrage & lacking the chutzpah to own their responsibility for poor performances and whatnot.

Helliwell & Putnam found that sub-national governmental effectiveness was higher in Italian regions with more social capital (1995). The extent of civic community citizen involvement can be related to higher investment rates, higher rates of education, more efficient government services, better social institutions, and more efficient operations (Helliwell & Putnam, 1995). I wonder how social capital might be related to or affected by levels of emancipative values or senses of self-determination, political efficacy, autonomy, and agency. I’d argue that the ceiling for social capital is higher when more opportunities which enable expressions of agency are available. It almost seems like a proxy for political participation.

To conceptualize PC, it may be important to consider it in terms of its inputs & outputs. The PC is a product of a number of factors and those factors are important for conceptualization of the product. How the product differs depending on different combinations of factors will increase understanding. A given ‘current PC status quo’ could even be a factor. The prevailing literature at present is more so about the actual political behavior. That conceptualization is useful, but there are so many things that can affect a culture. It is interesting to ask what norms are being enforced, but might be more interesting if research can point to why. The alternative conceptualization is more interdisciplinary and crosses different fields of literature to get a broader scope of what social science (as a whole) has already provided for reference. Is there overlapping utility or terminological functionality with traveling concepts? Synthesis is required for a general conceptualization about the inputs of PC and that makes cross-disciplinary analysis that much more interesting.

As far as measuring PC, it does depend on the conceptualization. If PC is the dependent variable, then measuring those independent factors is an option. There are also more direct ways to measure actual political behavior. The latter is simpler to devise reliable & valid measures for. It can be a much trickier prospect to explicate the inputs of a given culture (let alone measure them). It would be unfortunate if researchers resolved this tradeoff by opting to overweigh the variables they could devise a research design with and omit the importance of factors for which they could not conceive a method of measurement. More psychosocial reference might enable novel insight into PC drivers. Outlining subtle (and sometimes subliminal) cultural influences could allow admission of questions that aren’t answerable with political science literature alone.

There are so many factors of PC and PC is likely a factor in many other cultural developments. Different types of PC have different susceptibilities and/or strengths. Categorizing PCs with their factors in mind will help inform characterizations that might otherwise rely too much on ‘political behavior’ itself. What motivates those behaviors can be varied, but part of the difficulty of operationalizing PC is that there are so many layers of influence. Researchers might need to focus more so on subliminal influences. Consideration for how people are primed via mass media might be an interesting place to start more some of the more developed countries.

References

Blais, A., Morin-Chassé, A., & Singh, S. P. (2017). Election outcomes, legislative representation, and satisfaction with democracy. Party Politics, 23(1), 85-95.   

Helliwell, J. F., & Putnam, R. D. (1995). Economic growth and social capital in Italy. Eastern Economic Journal, 21(3), 295-307. 

Inglehart, R. (1971). The silent revolution in Europe: Intergenerational change in post-industrial societies. American Political Science Review, 65(4), 991-1017. 

Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. (2010). Agency, values, and well-being: A human development model. Social Indicators Research, 97(1), 43-63. 

Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. (2020). Political culture. In D. Caramani (Ed.), Comparative Politics (5th ed., 310-333). Oxford University Press. 

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Federal & Unitary Systems

This paper will discuss the pros & cons of unitary and federal governmental systems/arrangements. After refamiliarizing with some of the prominent literature on this debate and noting some of the strengths/weaknesses of the articles, one key benefit/cost will be discussed for each system of governance. The conclusion will address lingering questions and areas of potential future research.

Beginning with a lay of the land, Daniel Elazar compared three models of polity development: hierarchic, organic, and covenantal (1997). The hierarchic model was depicted as a pyramid (with a chain of command that leaves all decision-making authority/power at top [with the central government]) (Elazar, 1997, p. 238-239). Elazar used the “center-periphery model” to represent the organic origination (where the periphery has some influence on the center and where the locus of power is generated over time) (1997, p. 239). The covenantal model (also called the federal/matrix model) is described by Elazar as “a polity compounded of arenas within arenas held together by common framing institutions and a shared communications network” whose “origins are to be found in the deliberate coming together of equals to establish a mutually useful government framework within which all can function on an equal basis, usually defined by a pact” (1997, p. 239). Elazar explained how these models account for developmental-variance between French hierarchy, British club politics, and the United States’ ‘federal matrix of democracy’ (1997). Elazar even explored origin cases of Egypt (hierarchy), Mesopotamia (organic), and Ancient Greece/Israel (covenantal) (1997, p. 249). Elazar reported that “all three models produce institutions, are informed by political cultures, and lead to political behavior characteristic… to each” (1997, p. 237).

Floriana Cerniglia empirically investigated the extent and evolution of fiscal decentralization within a sample of OECD countries (2003). The central government revenues and expenditures were compared (as percentages of government totals in each respective category) cross-nationally and between two time periods (1977-1985 & 1986-1994) (Cerniglia, 2003, p. 758-759). Federal data (Australia, Austria, Canada & the U.S.) was compared & contrasted with unitary data (e.g., Denmark, Belgium, Finland, France, UK, Italy, Norway, Luxembourg, Ireland, Netherlands, and Sweden) (Cerniglia, 2003). Cerniglia also investigated shares of public employment by central governments, homogeneity indices (ethno-linguistic & religious groups), and centralization determinants (2003). On mean, unitary countries’ central governments had 20% higher proportions of expenditure and revenue than the federal countries (Cerniglia, 2003, p. 758-759). The degree of centralization is 10% higher in the domain of revenue than expenditure for both sample periods and categories (Cerniglia, 2003, p. 758-759). According to Cerniglia, the two main findings were: (1) “that land area, population, degree of urbanization and income per capita are negatively correlated with centralization” and (2) “heterogeneity in ethno-linguistic groups is significantly related to the observed decentralization in the patterns of expenditure on education and on religious, cultural and recreational services” (2003, p. 749).

Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel wrote a chapter of Daniele Caramani’s “Comparative Politics” textbook together, called “Multilevel Governance” (2023). Hooghe et al. said that there are two logics that underpin multilevel governance: (1) “a functionalist logic that conceives governance as an instrument for the efficient delivery of goods that individuals cannot provide for themselves” and (2) “the demand for self-rule by those living in distinctive communities” (2023, p. 215). Hooghe et al. described a “shift of authority towards regional or local government and away from central government” as decentralization (2023, p. 217). Hooghe et al. asserted, “The chief difference is that under federalism the centre cannot change the structure unilaterally whereas in a unitary state it can,” (2023, p. 218). The authors listed 3 chief trends that have been important for multilevel governance: (1) “a marked rise in both regional and local authority”, (2) “differentiated governance, in which governments at the same territorial level have divergent political, administrative, or fiscal powers”, and (3) “the scaling up of subnational government” or “the concentration of populations and resources in fewer, larger units” (Hooghe et al., 2023, p. 219-223). Hooghe et al. reported that democracy, ethno-territorial, and social policy can each be effects of multilevel governance (so, quality matters) (2023). Hooghe et al. also argued that the federal/unitary conceptualization is better represented as a continuum than a dichotomy and that multilevel governance may bridge “the divide because it reveals that unitary states may have multiple levels of government, directly elected regional assemblies, and strong regional or local executives” (while the distribution of authority is not anchored to a constitution as with federations) (2023, p. 219).

Ronald Watts provided an overview of different variations of federal political systems & governmental power sharing (2001). Watts described major federal institutional models (e.g., unions, constitutionally decentralized unions, federations, confederations, federacies, associated states, condominiums, leagues, joint functional authorities, and hybrids) (2001, p. 27). Watts noted that federations (which includes the United States) have a defining characteristic: “neither the federal nor the constituent units of government are constitutionally subordinate to the other” (2001, p. 27). The value of a constitution (& the commitment unto it) was highlighted throughout the article. Watts listed four major lessons to takeaway from reading his article: (1) some federations have fallen short, but shared rule and self-rule can mean combining the benefits or diversity & unity, (2) successful federations can depend on “public acceptance of the need to respect constitutional norms and structures and the rules of law”, (3) “development of mutual faith and trust among the different groups within a federation and an emphasis upon the spirit of tolerance and compromise”, and (4) “the extent to which a federation can accommodate political diversity is likely to depend not just on the adoption of federal arrangements, but upon whether the particular form or variant of federation that is adopted or evolved gives adequate expression to the desires and requirements of the particular society in question” (2001, p. 32).

Foweraker & Landman studied the relationship between constitutional design and democratic performance (2002). Parliamentary systems were found to perform better in measures of participation, civil rights, political rights, and minority rights (Foweraker & Landman, 2002). Unitary systems performed better than federal systems in participation, property rights, and minority rights (Foweraker & Landman, 2002). Proportional representation (PR) systems performed better than plurality systems in representation, minority rights, and participation (with the relationship reversed with regard to civil & property rights) (Foweraker & Landman, 2002). All of this was really interesting to consider in light of our recent attention paid to constitutional liberalism and the covenantal/organic/hierarchic models. Governance that is subordinate to a constitution sounds good on paper, but it can be a daunting challenge to write a document that effectively checks & balances, separates powers, and orients disparate state actors toward mutually-shared values. The U.S.A. model is especially interesting in that its constitution is so short and affords states local constitutional authority. As challenging as these pursuits may be, perhaps giving sub-national units more power will enable those smaller sub-units to be more responsive and flexible than the sweeping changes seen in more centralized states.

When considering the key costs & benefits of federal and unitary governmental systems, it might be tempting to call unitary systems more efficient due to the convenience of having a monopoly on authority (and therefore the ability to unilaterally make structural changes to the government). It may be apt to caution that there less hoops and hurdles doesn’t necessarily entail greater effectiveness. Although, perceiving themselves as having enough efficacy to perform executive duties across a number of different initiatives/projects may actually be less efficient (if there is more concern for merit/performance/quality than sheer expedience & stubbornness). From an organizational standpoint, it might seem to make sense to call greater centralization more ‘efficient’, but it might be less efficient when considering that managing numerous tasks might hinder the ultimate effectiveness of state response (inadvertent dereliction of duties due to sheer volume and constraints on time & attention). Central government reform can have broader implications for unitary polities. It may be argued that more consistent policy implementation, articulation, and enforcement can sometimes be more rigid than it is efficient.

Federal systems are not somehow fundamentally immune to rigidity either (as groups, organizations, & systems are not), but constitutional underpinning makes defines what it is the government is going to be rigid about. This can offer some sense security & predictability when the rule of law is accepted as legitimate within a nation (whereas unitary government can be less reliable & more volatile). There is undoubtedly still some uncertainty from federal governments, but there are subnational units in place which have their own process that are each grounded by the same set of principles, laws, etc. The decentralization helps facilitate a procedure that doesn’t overencumber a small number of decision makers. Instead, the system is designed to increase regional and local representation. The federal chain-of-command calls for competent delegation and trust (which can be costly in terms of sacrificing control/power & personnel demands).

‘To centralize or not to centralize?’ isn’t so much the question as “how much to centralize?’. Federal and unitary systems have central government, but there are a couple major distinctions: constitutions and distribution of authority. Unitary systems bear greater resemblance to authoritarian regimes than do federal ones, but that may have more to do with their vulnerability to authoritarian seizure of government (due to lacking checks/balances & separation of powers) than actual political performance and governance. The lack of institutional capacity to regulate unitary executives can make accountability a more difficult prospect. Scapegoating the central government may also be more effective for regimes that don’t mind losing face in the name of governmental continuity, turnover, and perceived legitimacy. In one fell swoop, public outcry could be extinguished. However, when new actors take over the helm of an overwhelmed central government, they will still face the possibility that they simply oversee too much and handicap subordinate discretion. Moving forward, other intriguing questions will be: ‘What are the costs and benefits of constitutions?’, ‘Where is overcentralization inefficient?’, and ‘What risk is unitary governance predisposed to that federalism is not?’.

References

Cerniglia, F. M. (2003). Decentralization in the public sector: Quantitative aspects in federal and unitary countries. Journal of Policy Modeling, 25, 749-776. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0161-8938(03)00069-3

Elazar, D. J. (1997). Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems. International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique, 18(3), 237–251. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601342

Foweraker, J., & Landman, T. (2002). Constitutional design and democratic performance. Democratization, 9(2), 43–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/714000250

Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Schakel, A.H. (2023). Multilevel governance. In D. Caramani (Ed.), Comparative politics (6th ed., pp. 214–332). Oxford University Press.

Watts, R. L. (2001). Models of federal power sharing. International Social Science Journal, 51(167), 23–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2451.00289