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Democracy Assessment: India & Mexico

Lukas Otteson

Professor Burkhart

POLS 597

Spring 2024

This assessment will be divided into five parts: (1) a discussion about democracy itself, (2) short summaries of each country’s democratic history, (3) comparison between the two & their levels of democracy, (4) reasons that help explain said levels, and (5) a projection as to how probable it is for democracy to exist in each country moving-forward.

Part 1

The Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem) explored seven principles throughout the book (Coppedge et al., 2020). Those seven principles are as follows: 1) electoral, 2) liberal, 3) majoritarian, 4) consensual, 5) participatory, 6) deliberative, and 7) egalitarian (Coppedge et al., 2020). Each of these principles embody core values, question, and attributes. With the electoral principle (1): the core values are contestation/competition; the main attributes are inclusive suffrage, clean elections, elected officials, freedom of association, freedom of expression, & alternative information; and the theme question is “Are important government offices filled by free and fair multiparty elections before a broad electorate?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the liberal principle (2): the core values are individual liberty, checks and balances, & constitutionalism; the main attributes are civil liberties, judicial independence, & legislative independence; and the theme question is “Is power constrained and are individual rights guaranteed?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the majoritarian principle (3): the core values are majority rule, power concentration, efficient decision-making, & responsible party government; the main attributes are power-concentrating institutions, power-centralizing institutions, & simple majority decision-making; and the theme question is “Does the majority rule via one party, and does it dominate policy making?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the consensual principal (4): the core values are voice/representation of all groups, power dispersion, & power sharing; the main attributes are power-dispensing institutions, power decentralizing institutions, & supermajority decision-making; and the theme question is “Do numerous, independent, and diverse groups and institutions participate in policy making?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the participatory principal (5): the core values are direct/active participation in decision-making by the people; the main attributes are high turnout, mechanisms of direct democracy, civil society activism, & local democracy; and the theme question is “Do citizens participate in political decision-making?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the deliberative principal (6): the core values are reasoned debate, rational arguments and consultation; the main attributes are public debate, respectful/open-minded discussions, reason to justification with reference to the public good, and consultative institutions; and the theme question is “Are political decisions the product of public deliberation based on reasoned and rational justification?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29). With the egalitarian principal (7): the core values are equal political capabilities; the main attributes are equal protection of rights/freedoms, equal distribution of politically relevant resources equal access to power; and the theme question is “Are all citizens equally capable to use their political rights?” (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 29).

          In what other ways might democracy be defined and/or thought about? Dahl made some significant contributions on this front with a small working-vocabulary, 5 proposed axioms, and a few general hypotheses (1971). Figure 1.1 is titled “Two Theoretical Dimensions of Democratization” (Dahl, 1971, p. 6). This figure has two axes (the x-axis being “Public Contestation” and the y-axis being “Right to participate in elections and office”) (Dahl, 1971, p. 6). Figure 1.2 is titled “Liberalization, Inclusiveness, and Democratization” (Dahl, 1971, p. 7). The x-axis is for “Inclusiveness (participation)” (or “popularization”) while the y-axis represents “Liberalization (public contestation)” (Dahl, 1971, p. 7). States range from closed hegemonies (unpopularized & illiberalized), oligarchies (non-inclusive with public contestation), open hegemonies (inclusive without public contestation), & polyarchies (liberalized & popularized) (Dahl, 1971).  Figure 1.4 depicted the “probability of competitive regime” by juxtaposing the costs of toleration and the costs of repression (Dahl, 1971, p. 16). Governments may be juggling these dilemmas whilst their own publics may deem their leaders irredeemable and already be completely convinced that it is they who can tolerate no more.

Dahl extended his arguments about history by looking at things a bit more theoretically with his chapters on “concentration” & “level of development” (1971). The first of the two is about how much power (violence or socioeconomic sanctioning) should be dispersed (Dahl, 1971). Is it monopolized (concentrated) by the government? Is it dispersed (depoliticized) too broadly (to the point of losing the ability to enforce laws)? These are important questions on their own, but they are perhaps of even greater interest when connected to the whole historical discussion. Let’s consider both a) competitive hierarchies & b) open hegemonies. Consider whether or not those systems are dispersed or concentrated. A competitive oligarchy (lacking inclusiveness) would be allowing public contestation, but restricting the ability for everyone to participate. An open hegemony would let everyone vote & be eligible for office, but it would prohibit public contestation. Each of these two systems will face a different reality with regard to the question of dispersal/concentration.

The competitive oligarchy and the open hegemony face different costs-of-tolerance/opposition. If an open hegemony dispersed power, then they’d be able to vote & hold office, but be forbidden from disagreeing with their masters of government. With an open hegemony’s concentration of power, the vote becomes mostly ritualistic (as Dahl put it) (1971). If a competitive oligarchy concentrated power, then everyone can contest all they want & still remain helpless to the whims of the government. The competitive oligarchy’s version of dispersing power would be theoretically expected to be an uneven distribution of such powers.

          With regard to levels of development, Dahl wrote that the “The higher the socioeconomic level of a country, the more likely it is to have a competitive political regime” and vice versa (1971, p. 64). It is also true that (according to Dahl’s reading of the data) higher socioeconomic levels mean a higher likelihood of polyarchy (or near-polyarchy) than with lower socioeconomic levels (1971). I recognized the possible spuriousness & indefinite causality with these phenomena. Dahl addressed that and concluded that he didn’t believe it was possible to nail that down yet (1971). Dahl stated that theory could help tease-out causal answers, but also asserted that the answers would not be “simple and one-directional” (1971, p. 71).

          Dahl provided a general hypothesis nonetheless: “The chances that a country will develop and maintain a competitive political regime (and, even more so, a polyarchy) depend up on the extent to which the country’s society and economy”: “(a) provide literacy, education, and communication”; “(b) create a pluralistic rather than a centrally dominated social order”; and “(c) prevent extreme inequalities among the politically relevant strata of the country” (1971, p. 74).

Throughout Dahl’s “Polyarchy,” readers are also offered five axioms that help to compartmentalize/contextualize the broader theory at play.

“Axiom #1: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the expected costs of toleration increase.”

“Axiom #2: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the expected costs of suppression increase.”

“Axiom #3: The more the cost of suppression exceed the costs of toleration, the greater the chance for a competitive regime.” (Dahl, 1971, p.15).

Dahl’s fourth Axiom is: “The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the resources available to the government for suppression decline relative to the resources of an opposition” (1971, p. 48).

Lastly, Axiom #5 was “The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases with a reduction in the capacity of the government to use violence or socioeconomic sanctions to suppress an opposition.”

Surely, Dahl & Coppedge et al. will provide useful insight for an attempt to explain the levels of democracy within each respective country. That said, Barrington Moore Jr. also provided some theoretically-progressive perspective in “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy” (1966). Moore listed five “main conditions that have apparently been most important for the development of democracy” (1966). How do India & Mexico fare in light of these preconditions & their history? Do Moore’s preconditions help make their experiences more understandable? These prerequisites will be useful as a sort of checklist alongside Coppedge et al. & Dahl’s frameworks. Those will be introduced in Part Four.

Freedom House represented democracy more than it defined it, penning “Democracy engenders constructive international cooperation and peaceful competition rather than violent confrontations,” and “Democracies adhere to the rule of law and form alliances based on shared norms of international behavior,” (2021). They wrote that whatever “failings” of American democracy there may be (or have been), we, nor democracy itself, is defined by such failures (2021). Rather, “It is our response to these shortcomings, our resilience in the face of adversity, that has thus far guided our path,” (2021). Democracy is not some utopia. Instead, Freedom House wrote: “It is the honest admission that democracy is messy, and often fails to produce rapid responses to pressing problems. But democracy possesses self-correcting properties that brittle authoritarian regimes do not. The answer to democracy’s shortcomings is more responsive democracy,” (2021). Democratic systems may catch low-hanging flak from opportunist mud-slingers, but tyrannical alternatives are hardly appealing to those accustomed to having a voice & a vote. “Citizens of democracies can effect change by regularly holding their governments accountable for their failings” (Freedom House, 2021). Furthermore, Freedom House continued, “Dissatisfaction, even alienation, occurs within democracies when ‘throwing the rascals out’ through elections doesn’t produce the change the public seeks. But accountability is still democracy’s greatest strength. For authoritarian regimes, accountability is democracy’s greatest threat,” (Freedom House, 2021). What respectable public-figure would stake their reputation on advocating against accountability? Freedom House operationalizes their views with seven interrelated strategies: (1) “elevating democracy as a core policy priority through a Presidential Directive and a National Democracy Strategy”; (2) “revitalizing our diplomacy to support democracy; (3) “strengthening the pillars of democracy, including free and fair elections, independent media, and civil society”; (4) integrating the development and regulation of technology with shared democratic and human rights values; (5) countering and curbing the poisonous flood of disinformation; (6) combating corruption and kleptocracy; and (7) “using economic statecraft to support open societies and inclusive economies,” (2021).

          The V-Dem Institute also shared their views about democracy more so than defining it, saying “The study of democracy and democratization lies at the center of political science and is increasingly important in economics, sociology, and history,” (n.d.). Contextualizing their perspective, they continued: “In the post-Cold War world, democracy has also become a central foreign policy objective for many countries, and is often a critical condition for the distribution of international development assistance. The transition to democracy and its consolidation remains a key issue in global development today,” (V-Dem Institute, n.d.). The V-Dem Institute also has their own approach to operationalizing democratization: utilizing data (600+ indicators from 1789-present) for “all countries of the world,” (n.d., Varieties of Democracy section). About their “fundamentally different approach,” they listed 3 reasons that set them apart: (1) “as a large global collaboration among scholars with diverse areas of expertise”; (2) as the first project attempting to explain different varieties of democracy”; and (3) “thanks to the highly disaggregated V-Dem data, the first project to explore causal mechanisms linking different aspects of democracy together,” (V-Dem Institute, n.d., Varieties of Democracy section). With specific to their “Country Experts,” the V-Dem Institute reported five items for their selection criteria: (1) “Expertise – Validated expert knowledge in the country and specific areas to be coded,”; (2) “Local, In-Depth Knowledge - By design, two-thirds of Country Experts providing data on a country should be nationals or permanent residents of that country,”; (3) “Seriousness of purpose - Willingness to devote time to the project and to deliberate carefully over the questions in the survey,”; (4) “Impartiality - V-Dem aims to recruit Country Experts who will answer survey questions in an impartial manner,”; and (5) “Diversity - In professional background among the Country Experts chosen for a particular country,” (n.d., Country Experts section). They also employ Pemstein et al.’s (as cited in V-Dem Institute, n.d.) “Bayesian Item-Response Theory (IRT) estimation strategy that accounts for many concerns regarding problems with the expert-coded data, while also providing estimates of remaining random measurement error” in order to “convert the ordinal responses experts provide into continuous estimates of the concepts being measured,” (V-Dem Institute, n.d., A Bayesian Item-Response Theory (IRT) Estimation Strategy section).

          Dr. Monty G. Marshall (Director of the Polity Project & the Center for Systemic Peace) directly addressed the challenging task of defining/describing democracy, saying that “Democracy is not an abstract notion; it is a management technique that provides educated humans the ability to manage complexity,” (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). Marshall added, “Modern societal-systems are complex cooperation schemes governed by the rule of law, that is, the codification of those essential cooperation schemes so that individual citizens can act (by compliance) to augment and, so, ensure the common good,” (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). There is certainly some overlap here with the writings mentioned earlier from Freedom House (the citizens of a democracy ought be empowered). Marshall also stated, “Democracy is not a voting system, although voting has become prominent as a decision-making method. All forms of governance employ voting procedures to some extent,” and that it “happens naturally in well-developed systems when most citizens accept a vow of non-violence and recognize the legitimacy of enforcement through judicial law” (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). For Marshall, the empowerment of the democratically governed is not without its inherent responsibilities. Beyond merely following rules, these systems also required “super-cooperator” managers that “prioritize the common good and work to build and maintain system cooperation,” (Marshall, 2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). That isn’t all, though. The power of the vote is not glossed over. Marshall commented that “Leadership selection is not a personal popularity contest but, rather, a whole-of-society testament of faith and trust in leadership candidacy and responsibility to the future of the nation, (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). Marshall didn’t miss the chance to call the ‘leaders’ to the mat either, stating that “Political parties are groups charged with identifying and presenting for leadership approval (national elections) only those persons who demonstrate the ability and capacity to maintain (and repair or adapt) the system into the future,” (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). Again, nobody is calling democratic system utopic. Marshall concluded: “We must recognize and accept that complex systems are not only superior in performance but, also, prone to pathologies, the worst among which are political anomie, violence, and chaos. These can only be resolved through enhanced cooperation and our mutual embrace of our common predicament,” (2024, Commentary from the CSP Director). Far from cynicism in the face adversity, Marshall prescribed resilience & a proactive attitude.

Part Two

          The Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem) conducts reviews of countries to illustrate their democratic development. For the purposes of this assignment, V-Dem’s 2016 reviews were valuable resources. Both India’s & Mexico’s V-Dem data-briefs utilize data from 1905, 1950, 1995, & 2014. Each brief included a short synopsis of each country’s 100+ year progress.

Starting with India, they’re “the second most populous country in the world and one of the fastest-growing and most powerful economies,” (Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016, Introduction section). Mechkova & Lindberg reported, “The country’s democratic development progressed significantly after achieving independence from the United Kingdom in 1947 and the adoption of the 1949 constitution which proclaims the Republic of India and assures justice, equality and liberty to its citizens,” (2016, Introduction section). Starting in 1920, there were direct elections to parliament under British rule, but universal suffrage did not happen until 1951 (Mechkova &Lindberg, 2016). Some 20 years later, PM Gandhi “issued a state of emergency which covered the entire country,” causing elections to be suspended, civil liberties restricted, and political dialogue to be limited (Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016, Introduction section). As a consequence: elections were suspended, civil liberties were restricted and the political dialogue was limited. It wasn’t until 1977 that the country escaped the “emergency period” and attained the “more stable state of political life” that continued until 2014 (the end of V-Dem’s data-capturing) (Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016, Introduction section)

Mexico’s story began with their 1821 declared independence from Spain (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016). “Following independence, the country suffered numerous wars and experienced two empires and a dictatorship rule by the autocrat Porfirio Díaz,” (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016, Introduction section). Díaz led his country to 10 years of Mexican Revolution from 1910 to 1920 (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016). This revolution became more of a civil war with severe struggles for power (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016). Andersson & Lindberg reported that social & political development led to “central social reforms and the drafting of the Mexican constitution in 1917,” but armed conflict continued until the 1920s (2016, Introduction section). Mexico found itself with mixed results: 71 years (until 2000) of monopolistic leadership under the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) political party & the birth of their constitution (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016). There was a bit of partisan parity in the 1980s (which helped instigate some democratic development), but a more distinct democratic experience wasn’t realized until the end of the 80s and the 1990s (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016). Since then, the Mexican government has become bicameral and directly elected, with executive power vested in the hands of the president, who is head of state & government (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016).

Part 3

In order to compare the two & their levels of democracy, this assessment will utilize 6 figures from each V-Dem Country Brief. Figures 1A/B & 2A/B compile the aggregated scores for V-Dem’s core principles (with the latter adding scores for a “Female Rights index” (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). 4 specific components were paid additional attention: Deliberative, Female Rights, Liberal, & Participatory. However, before delving into the figures, it is worth noting that the Electoral component was the second highest score for each according to Figures 2A & 2B (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016).

As of 2014, both countries’ lowest scores were in the Participatory index component and both of their high scores were in the Deliberative index (see Figure 2A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; see Figure 2B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). The Liberal component was India’s second highest score (fourth for Mexico) and Female Rights was the second highest score for Mexico (while nearly last for India) (see Figure 2A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; see Figure 2B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). According to Figures 1A & 1B: both countries were almost entirely undemocratic at the turn of the 20th century, developed democratically during the 1905-1950 & 1950-1995 periods, and experienced some stagnation from 1995 to 2014 (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). While Mexico’s stagnation was not marked by any component regression, India saw a reversal in both Deliberative & Egalitarian indices (see Figure 1A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; see Figure 1B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016).

According to Figures 4A & 4B (Liberal Democracy Component) both countries (as of 2014) have steadily constrained their executives (judicially & legislatively) to about the same degree, but Indian scores in “Equality before the law and individual liberty” were about 20% lower (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). Their historical patterns were as unique as they are, though. Mexico’s legislative constraints on executives were almost non-existent between 1930 & 1980 while their judicial constraint on executives & equality before the law and individual liberty were stagnant throughout that same timeframe (see Figure 4A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016). Indian legislative/judicial constraints on executives began growing in the mid-1930s, but equality before the law and individual liberty lagged behind until the mid 1940s (see Figure 4B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). Generally speaking, Mexico scored about .05 lower in their executive constraints (see Figure 4A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; see Figure 4B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016).

Figures 5A & 5B (Participatory Democracy Component) revealed that both countries have the same order of scores from high-to-low: “civil society participation”, “regional government”, and “local government” (see Figure 5A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; see Figure 5B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). In both countries, “direct popular vote” is non-existent throughout the entire data-set (see Figure 5A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; see Figure 5B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). Mexico’s development appears to align more with the collapse of the Soviet Union while the Indian growth spurt coincided with the end of WWI (and the US-Vietnam ‘war’ in the case of “civil society participation” (see Figure 5A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; see Figure 5B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016).

Figure 6B (Deliberative Democracy Component) illustrated, again, that general Indian-democratic post-WWII growth-spurt (Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). Mechkova & Lindberg also showed that India’s government reached the same scores for “respect counterarguments”  in the 1960s as they did between the collapse of the Soviet Union and around the beginning of the ‘Global War on Terror’ (see Figure 6B, 2016). India experienced a regressive reversal around the same time that the US-Vietnam conflict & PM Gandhi’s emergency period came to their respective ends. Mexico’s most consistent score was in “Common good” throughout the data-set (see Figure 6A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016). “Engaged society” was India’s high-score (see Figure 6B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). Both countries shared “Range of consultation” (second highest) and “Reasoned justification” (lowest) rankings (see Figure 6A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; see Figure 6B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016).

Lastly, Figures 8A & 8B represent the Female Rights Index for each country (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). India & Mexico shared some similar results with both scoring: highest on “property rights,” lowest in “access to justice” & “power distribution by gender,” and with the same three components following their top scores (“freedom of domestic movement”, “discussion for women”, & “CSO women’s participation”) (see Figure 8A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; see Figure 8B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). Figures 8A & 8B showed “Freedom for labor” to be tied as lowest for India, but Mexico scored about 1 indicator higher (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016).

Part 4

          Moore’s aforementioned preconditions are as follows: (1) development of a balance to avoid too strong a crown or two independent a landed aristocracy, (2) a turn toward an appropriate form of commercial agriculture, (3) the weakening of a landed aristocracy, (4) the prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the peasants and workers, and (5) a revolutionary break with the past (1966, p. 430-432). Moore’s angle here seems to align will with Dahl’s toleration/suppression concern. The authors’ works complement each other well for the purposes of estimates historical happenings & potential, current growing-pains. Take these preconditions into account alongside the other democratic visions from the earlier scholarly authors & organizations. The governed & the representatives are groups that exist in countless historical records (likewise for India & Mexico). Aristocracy, oligarchy, hegemony… they can all be evaluated in terms of their toleration of public contestation & inclusive participation.

Each country has their own history and their experiences with tides of values. They’ve witnessed the 20th century from very different geographical positions. Those differences manifest in very disparate diplomatic realities. India has seen an imperial China become chronically dissatisfied with the overall international order. Mexico’s northern neighbor seems to be content with the amount of territory that is has seized. Both countries face different economic growing pains.

Figures 2A & 2B illustrate a desire to maintain some of their achieved growth (Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016), but they may face real-world constraints that limit growth. They don’t exist in a vacuum. They have economic competitors & neighbors (some more competitive than others). Each nation appears to be committed to difficult tasks related to continuing their democratic advancement. They each appear to have weathered their share of storms to achieve what they have. They can’t flip their populations’ worldviews upside-down overnight without risking regression & perceived over-reliance on world powers. Ill-conceived revolutions because unnecessary uncertainty are unwelcomed setbacks and there are plenty floating around on the internet that are designed to radicalize & polarize.

On the world stage, both want to be neutral enough to stay included trade & commerce. These general stagnations may be the results of adversarial efforts to undermine a coalition belonging to fairly overt democratic bloc (i.e., NATO, United Nations). Even if fair-trade is commencing & the conspiring is merely perceived (not real), then it would be understandable to distance from the decisions made by global actors that have dramatically differing risk-reward analyses.

Part 5

          The question of their continued democratic development is interesting because V-Dem found them each to have reached aggregate stagnation (see Figure 1A, Andersson & Lindberg, 2016; see Figure 1B, Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016). However, V-Dem’s disaggregating components enable a different view toward answering that question. These smaller components & indices permit a finer-grain perspective with regard to political culture (one more representative of the complex systems these countries are attempting to grapple with).

          It might be difficult to assess the likelihood of continued democratic development without consideration for the range of possible futures ahead of us. If China were to catch irridentism about Tibet or Nepal, then the diverse Indian population & their government might become too impatient to vote & discuss. If Mexico were used as a proxy-battlefield, they too may find delayed gratification to be an unaffordable.

          If the status-quo continues without major interstate wars or superpower civil wars, then maybe the same stagnated patterns will continue. There were a few large, global events that were correlated with spikes in democratic cultivation. That said, it is well known enough by now (hopefully) that correlation does not equal causation. Some hesitancy with presumptive conclusions is usually a good instinct, but treating their progress as superfluous may create some sorts of self-fulfilling prophecies. Hard-won advancement should be met with benefits to help incentivize against & offset the costs. Classical conditioning & behaviorism are not the prescription, but rewarding the prosocial use of agency might be something that the international community needs to keep an eye on (if they aren’t already). Rather than carrots & sticks, earned privileges might be worthy food-for-though moving forward.

References

Andersson, F. & S.I. Lindberg (2016) V-Dem Institute. *Country brief: Mexico*. Retrieved from https://www.v-dem.net/media/publications/country_brief_mexico.pdf

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S. E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., ... & Wilson, S. (2011). Varieties of democracy: Measurement model testing and comparison. Kellogg Institute.

Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. Yale University Press.

Freedom House. (2021). Reversing the Tide: Introduction. Democracy Task Force. Retrieved August 2, 2024, from https://freedomhouse.org/democracy-task-force/special-report/2021/reversing-the-tide/introduction

Marshall, M.G. (2024). Systemic Peace. Retrieved August 2, 2024, from https://www.systemicpeace.org/index.html

Mechkova, V. & Lindberg, S.I. (2016) V-Dem Institute. *Country brief: India*. Retrieved from https://v-dem.net/media/publications/country_brief_india.pdf

Moore, B. (1966). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. Beacon Press.

V-Dem Institute. (n.d.). The V-Dem Project. Retrieved August 2, 2024, from https://www.v-dem.net/about/v-dem-project/