101
Past, Present, Future: Containing the Terror of 21st Century Chinese Civil War
Lukas Otteson
POLS 525 Civil War & Terrorism
Professor Allen
7 May, 2025
Some historical background is needed understand the syntax of the conflicts between the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This story began when the world was still looking to the League of Nations. The First East Turkestan Republic (founded at Kashgar in 1933) was attacked by Soviet-backed Hui and Chinese forces, leading to the disestablishment of the republic (Xinjiang Documentation Project). Between 1934 and 1944, Xinjiang was effectively ruled over as a Soviet satellite state (though nominally Chinese) (Xinjiang Documentation Project). That meant gulags and intellectual persecutions (in following Stalin’s lead). Sheng Shicai, caught between the USSR and PRC, was unable to develop a sufficient regional economy (Xinjiang Documentation Project).The Second East Turkestan Republic (established in 1944) fought with the Nationalist army of the Republic of China through the summer of 1945 before its disestablishment in June, 1946 (absorbed into Xinjiang province with leadership maintaining control over the region) (Xinjiang Documentation Project). After a pre-negotiation plane crash in Beijing with Mao Zedong, a separate Xinjiang delegation went to Beijing to vocalize support for the CCP (June 1949), Xinjiang was incorporated as a PRC province in September 1949 (with the newly installed government describing the events surrounding surrender as a peaceful liberation) (Xinjiang Documentation Project). In 1954, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) a paramilitary, was formed as a state within the state of Xinjiang (Xinjiang Documentation Project). The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region replaced province in 1955 (note: the population was 70% Uyghur as that point) (Xinjiang Documentation Project). The Yi-Ta Incident (April 1962) saw 60,000 Kazakhs and Uyghurs fleeing from China into the Soviet Union (Xinjiang Documentation Project). The XPCC dissolution in 1975 was caused by disruption due to the cultural revolution (Xinjiang Documentation Project). In 1981, the XPCC was re-established to counter ‘separatists, religious extremists and terrorists’ in the border areas due to the U.S.S.R.’s invasion of Afghanistan (Xinjiang Documentation Project). The Baren Township Riots (in July 1990) saw 23 killed, 21 wounded, and almost 8,000 arrested for “criminal activities of ethnic splittists and other criminal offenders.” 6 years later, the PRC’s “Strike Hard” campaign initiated the specific targeting of “splittism and illegal religious activities,” (Xinjiang Documentation Project). The Xinjiang Documentation details the regional timeline between the 1600s and 1997 (right to the year ETIP was founded (n.d.). In 1997, reports on crackdowns against “splittism and dissent” were characterized by disagreement over casualty reports, two weeks of martial law, and approximately 1,600 arrests (Xinjiang Documentation Project).
When ETIP was listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. in 2002, they were associated with Al-Qaida and the Taliban (United Nations). They’ve planned attacks at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, sought explosive equipment, coordinated suicide bombings, kidnapped hostages, etc. (United Nations). While the United State may not list it as an active terrorist organization, that doesn’t mean they aren’t still conducting their training in Central Asia or arming up for more attacks.
The East Turkestan Islamic Movement’s intentions appear more violent and forceful when observers fail to zoom out on the graph of history in the region. There is pre-existing resentment and a presence historical grievance. Based on the results of their efforts, though, it looks like ETIP struggles with executing their operations and converting their power resources. They keep getting caught while they’re conspiring and there could be a number of reasons why. They could have moles in their ranks. Their members may be overly exuberant about material appeals. They’re lack of recent activity could very well be the space where they recalibrate their strategies to align better with constraints. For whatever reason, they’ve taken a huge step back since the days of targeting the Olympics. Whatever they are doing, the United States is recognizing that their overt activity in Xinjiang has ceased. Could that mean that they’ll have their backing when they publicly plea for good governance and real autonomy/sovereignty? That is to say, what if they’re obscurity is a sign of progress? That’s also possible, but is reform feasible? If not, then asymmetric warfare will appeal and it will likely seem a form of self-defense to those who feel conquered.
The long-term situation is about more than just China or Xinjiang. The ethno-geohistory and ongoing border disputes are matters of important to great powers. Türkiye is militarily cooperating with China & Russia (whilst being in NATO). If Ankara is negotiating peace deals between Ethiopia-Somalia and the Sudanese Army-RSF, they could play an influential role in Xinjiang. India is not seen as a neutral party here either. Diplomatically, their mediation/peacekeeping would likely be unpalatable for China. The CCP could get around Türkiye’s involvement, but India insists that the Uyghurs are oppressed and Türkiye has not publicly indicated that they’re interested in reforming governance as much as supporting counterinsurgency against a group based on a contested label. An independent Xinjiang might be better for Indian security, but is that what’s best for the people living in that state? If their autonomy is to be legally respected, then can the U.N. do anything about China’s retaliation against casting a referendum and choosing to become Indian (or Turkish)? Turkiye & China are increasing cooperation in Xinjiang. Should China involve India? Should Urumqi have to ask Beijing for permission to do so if they prefer another government to protect their sovereignty, rights, etc.?
Xinjiang has pluralistic, multicultural demands without liberal institutions. If Xinjiang needs liberal institutions, can Beijing tolerate that? It seems keeping Xinjiang might ultimately disrupt their status quo more than if they let them go. How disruptive is the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) to such ideal solutions? Do they stand in the way of constructive progress or is it more the state? Maybe they’ll just rebrand if they’re going to so significantly change their strategy. What happens to the Central Asian cells if Xinjiang is moderate and free? China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is notable and the Central Asian ETIP presence may well be something to keep an eye one, but India also has China’s Pakistani military naval ports to worry about. What if China buys all of India’s neighbors? Is that appeasement? How many countries can’t have civil liberties for the sake of Sino control over trade? Will the UN have any appetite for litigating or mediating this issue? Should an autonomous Xinjiang be free to negotiate its own particular security dilemma or does it have to wait until crackdowns on demonstrations? Is enough being done to help them advocate on their own behalves?
Maybe they’ll just fold into joining Al-Qaida at that point.
There is a state’s rights debate to be had here, but perhaps not by this group. Hopefully interlinguistic translation services and information technology can reduce the perceived permissiveness of violence (via game theoretic uncertainty and whatnot). Ultimately, though, what if the national will is to be poor and insecure? That’s why we don’t rule by direct argumentum ad populum democracy, but who are the representatives for such intersectional issues? Where does public-signaling leak into state intervention? Are non-state actors empowered in this environment? Can India afford wait and watch idly for China to arrange how it can most probabilistically assert its will and preferable conditions/outcomes?
A Chinese civil war might be most likely sparked in Xinjiang, but that doesn’t mean it will stop there. Why would people in Hong Kong or Shanghai care so much about Xinjiang that they’d revolt themselves? Standing up to the CCP and the PLA is a dangerous prospect.
Perhaps they’d rationalize and justify Revolution out of fear that Xi Jinping is going to lose the region if better governance isn’t practice. In the case of deciding to onset a war, they’d need believe that secession is on the line soon. Will the story be more about consolidating control or integrating into government? Will Xinjiang be more than, less than, or equally autonomous than Taiwan? Will the unitary Chinese government continue calling political participation and public opposition ‘separatism’? Or will they learn how to tolerate being allies instead of lords? If they choose the latter in the short-term, they risk the former in the long-term. Does the nation benefit from years of conflict on their borders?
Conclusion
After the Great Famine, referring to a 1949 relationship between Xinjiang and the People’s Republic of China isn’t persuasive enough. Following the end of World War II and the end of China’s 22 year on/off-again civil war, the Cultural Revolution was characterized by mass displacement and fleeing. Miles Yu reported, “Since Mao’s murderous Great Famine of the Great Leap Forward, ethnic Uyghurs and Kazaks living inside Xinjiang had made dangerous exoduses crossing the border into the Soviet Union, outraging the CCP,” (2022). Beijing has proven unwilling to accommodate the cultural demands of this region. Whether militias will again be used in Xinjiang is most in the control of the CCP/PRC, but had ETIP not been effectively countered the state of affairs could have been much more chaotic and destructive. If Sino law-and-order over this timeline ends up with a Xinjiang ready to govern itself, then there’s a decent moral steelman available for China’s case in the region. Whether they are motivated at all by moral appeals will be revealed over more time. Does China’s unrestricted warfare posture apply to something they see as a domestic issue. Could that framing be more protective against foreign intervention than it is a reflection of caring for governance in Xinjiang?
There’s a cryptocurrency in misattributing future civil disobedience as coming from an active ETIP if they are not, in fact, still active in the region. Lumping all of the Uyghurs together (or ethnic minorities for that matter) for mass scapegoating and collective punishment might still be feasible (for China) given the right information ecosystem conditions. That, however, could be a tradeoff between short-run and long-run security. False-flag, patsy-blaming ETIP might be a tempting proposition for a ruling party in a bind, but the free press is not going to offer Xi Jinping cover fire for such tactics (i.e., they won’t get away with it). China has demonstrated little interest in being caught for subverting international norms (more so with espionage than sabotage). With global attention on the issues in this region, what does China gain from keeping it? Is all of this for mining rights? The PRC faces consequential decisions about what they want to prioritize moving forward. Re-education camps might be less beneficial than delegating some power to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, but that would be a major shift in Sino-policy.
References
Council on Foreign Relations. 2014. “East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).” Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim.
Deutsche Welle. 2020. “US Removes Separatist Group Condemned by China from Terror List.” DW, November 6. https://www.dw.com/en/us-removes-separatist-group-condemned-by-china-from-terror-list/a-55527586.
United Nations Security Council. n.d. “Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement.” UN Security Council: 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/eastern-turkistan-islamic-movement.
Xinjiang Documentation Project. n.d. “Historical Overview of Events Shaping the Politics of Xinjiang.” The University of British Columbia. Accessed May 1, 2025. https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/historical-overview/.
Yu, Miles, M., 2022. “The 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts: A Key Turning Point in the Cold War.” Hoover Institution. https://www.hoover.org/research/1969-sino-soviet-border-conflicts-key-turning-point-cold-war.
